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The consolidation of a universal health system coupled with a process of regional devolution 
characterise the institutional reforms of the National Health System (NHS) in Spain in the last two 
decades. However, scarce empirical evidence has been reported on the effects of both changes in 
health inputs, outputs and outcomes, both at the country and at the regional level. This paper 
examines the empirical evidence on regional diversity, efficiency and inequality of these changes in 
the Spanish NHS using cross-correlation, panel data and expenditure decomposition analysis. Results 
suggest that besides significant heterogeneity, once we take into account region-specific needs there 
is evidence of efficiency improvements whilst inequalities in inputs and outcomes, although more 
‘visible’, do not appear to have increased in the last decade. Therefore, the devolution process in the 
Spanish Health System offers an interesting case for the experimentation of health reforms related 
to regional diversity but compatible with the nature of a public NHS, with no sizeable regional 
inequalities.  
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1.  Introduction  
 
Universal access and an important devolution process of health care to the Spanish regions 
(Autonomus Communities, AC from now) are the main features of an evolving public health system 
during the last 25 years. Although universal access to health care to all Spanish citizens was formally 
defined in the 1978 Constitution and articulated in the 1986 the General Health Bill, it was until 1999 
that general taxation finance ultimately substituted payroll taxes [1]. Despite some political 
turbulences, since 1981, a gradual process of devolution of health care, initiated in Catalonia and the 
Basque Country and completed for all the AC in January 2002, has been going on. As a result, 
health care reforms in Spain d riven by cost-containment purposes have run in parallel to those 
transcendental changes.  However it has hardly been undertaken thereafter any assessment on what 
the health system buys and its value. Prior studies do not fully take into account existing regional 
heterogeneity, regardless of being one of the k-factors for policy innovation in health care. Persisting 
questions in the analysis are the influence of changes in increasing efficiency by improving 
accountability and cost containment as well as in a chieving (or not loosing) equity and social 
cohesion [2-5]. 
 
Spain is indeed a widely heterogeneous country due to economic, cultural as well as political 
grounds [1]. Accordingly, a devolved model of welfare governance was designed at the onset of 
democracy whereby health care and education became the core of the Spanish fiscal 
decentralisation. The Spanish health system has followed a process of ‘asymmetric devolution’ 
started in 1981 and concluded in 2002. Only five Autonomous Communities (AC) - Catalonia and 
Galicia plus some other aiming for a higher self-governance status as Valencia, Canary Islands and 
Andalusia- were from the beginning ‘politically accountable’ for health care and two other AC– 
Navarra and the Basque Country – have been in addition ‘fiscally accountable’ in accordance with 
their historical statutes. The remaining ten new-branched AC have had very limited health care 
political and fiscal responsibilities, being centrally managed by the National Institute of Health 
(Instituto Nacional de la Salud, INSALUD) today practically abolished. In 2002 devolution was 
completed and at present all AC enjoy full health care responsibilities, although still with limited fiscal 
capacity, whilst the so called- Cohesion and Quality Law passed by in 2003 states the need of 
strengthening geographical equality of health protection as well as quality of care.   
   4
In its fundamental conception, devolution aims on the one hand to better serve specific 
health care demands and regional  preferences [3-5]. On the other hand, concerns on this regard 
refer to the potential for an uneven geography of welfare given the split of responsibilities jointly with 
lack of information and coordination of the central government among regions [6]. However, scarce 
empirical evidence has been reported on the effects of devolution - and policy innovation- in health 
inputs, outputs and outcomes, both at the country and at the regional level in Spain.  
 
This paper tries to cover this gap by examining the empirical evidence on regional diversity, 
efficiency and inequality in the Spanish system of regional health services, often named as National 
Health System (NHS). We undertake empirical analysis using cross-correlation, panel data and 
expenditure decomposition analysis. Results suggest  that although the existence of significant 
heterogeneity, once we take region-specific needs and bring to light efficiency improvements, 
inequalities in inputs and outcomes do not seem to have increased over time due to decentralisation. 
Consistently with  other studies we find that there is no clear-cut evidence that devolution bring 
regional inequalities [3-4]. Furthermore, unlike previous studies [6], we argue regional asymmetry is 
determined not only by supply conditions but by need, what in turn may well enhance an effect in the 
heterogeneity of regional health expenditure. Therefore, increasing political accountability leads to 
the fulfilment of region-specific conditions and demands and in turn, improves the NHS efficiency. 
 
The structure of this paper is as follows. First we provide a basic description of the health 
system, its structure and expenditure trends and determinants. Section three looks at evidence on 
efficiency while section four examines evidence on clinical outcomes and equity both at the 
individual and regional level. Section five examines non-clinical outcomes. The paper concludes with 
a discussion section.     5
2.  Description of the system, finance, expenditure and challenges 
2.1 Health system goals  
The Spanish National Health Service (NHS) might be envisaged as one of the most dynamic 
European health care systems in the last half century. In the early 1940s the health system was 
based on means test and covered around one fifth of the population, which expanded to almost half 
by 1960 and thanks to significant investment, coverage was roughly 80% by the mid 1970s. Although 
democracy and the 1978 Constitution defined citizens’ rights to health care it was with the General 
Health Bill in 1986 passed by under the socialist government that health care adopted lines of a 
universal and decentralised NHS. Central and regional governments have put into force extended 
coverage and fostered the implementation of health care reforms on a decentralised basis. Finally, 
the conservative party ended in 1999 the gradual transition process towards a full general tax 
revenues financing regime and concluded in 2002 the decentralisation process of health care to all 
the Spanish regions (previously only just the historical regions managed health care).  All this has 
been achieved in less than three decades.  
 
At any rate and purpose, health care is currently the foremost policy responsibility of the AC 
– jointly with education accounts for 60-70% of total funds managed by AC. The transfer of health 
responsibilities to Catalonia was completed in 1981, followed by Andalusia (1984), the Basque 
country and Valencia (1988), Galicia and Navarre (1991), the Canary Islands (1994) and from 2002, 
the rest of AC have been empowered with health care responsibilities. Furthermore, the design if 
AC leads to heterogeneous regions in size which ranges from less than three hundred thousand 
millions population up to over seven millions inhabitants. Regardless, the central state goals of 
uniformity amongst – historically and culturally- different AC in self-governance aims have lead to a 
so-called    ‘coffee-for-all’ decentralisation. Under this new scenario, central responsibilities on 
health policy coordination are pursued from scratch by the Spanish Department of Health, following 
the premises of the Health Quality and Cohesion Act of 2003.  
 
Although health care is legally defined as an “essential public service” jointly with education, it is 
difficult to find the precise content of the health care entitlement as well as an explicit definition of 
NHS goals, both at the state and at the regional level. As stated in the 1986 General Health Care 
Act, the NHS is expected to work towards both health promotion and illness prevention, by providing   6
health care to all residents in Spain, and achieving equality of access as well as to help to overcome 
social and geographical differences.  Efficiency is blurredly defined and just very recent concern 
buried by ‘financial sustainability’ goals. Therefore, the assessment of policy-goal adequacy is 
unavoidably normative and not always informative.  
 
Access to health care is free at the point of use to all residents (including illegal immigrants) and 
user co-payments are restricted to pharmaceuticals. In 2002 funded less than 8% of public drug 
expenditure in 2002. Benefits are comprehensive although coverage for some services such as long-
term care and dental services is limited and varies according to region-specific demands
1. While 
basic legislation is in principle issued by the central state, certai n common decisions draw upon the 
input of the Inter-Territorial Council of the NHS -an advisory committee comprising representatives 
from the central and regional governments- where coordination, as legally defined, must take place. 
Central governance of the NHS is formally undertaken by the Ministry of Health (MoH), although in 
some critical domains the Ministry of Social Security  - still the owner of the buildings- and the 
Ministry of Finance exercise remarkable responsibilities. As a result, the MoH can be classified as 
comparatively weak, bearing in mind the shared responsibilities with other ministries at the central 
level, and the strength of regional ministries after the devolution process. A synthetic (empirical, 
according to the observed rules and financial flows) definition of the NHS Spanish NHS is provided 
in Figure 1.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
2.2 The system structure 
 
Health care delivery is mainly undertaken through a network of publicly owned, staffed and 
operated inpatient and outpatient centres, with significant geographical differences in the way 
services are contracted out to the private sector. Although access is free, one sixth of Spanish 
purchase supplementary health insurance, mostly in richer urban areas as a means for ‘waiting lists 
                                                 
1 Unlike most of AC, the Basque Country and Andalusia cover child dental care. Similarly, whereas long-term 
care is defined as a public responsibility in some regional basic statutory Law (e.g., Cantabria, Castilla-La 
Mancha), in some other regions it is defined as an individual responsibility publicly supported (e.g., 
Catalonia).   7
avoidance’ in elective care, hospital amenities and prompt access to ‘soft’ private health care [9-
10]. Non-transparent waiting lists counterbalance tight (particularly in the last decade) NHS 
budgets, playing the role of actual ‘implicit prices’. 
 
Primary care in Spain has progressively moved towards a better-integrated public system, 
geographically organised in ‘health zones’ and managed at the level of the ‘health area’ covering 50-
100 thousand inhabitants. As a result of the success of the integration of primary care in the late 
eighties in the NHS network, the population affiliated to a primary care physician was 91% in 2000 
and the number of GP consultation has risen from 5.4 in 1994 to 6.1 in 2002 partly for prescription 
purposes. Ambulatory care is organised in Health Care Centres (average time per GP consultation is 
6.6 minutes), where most of GPs and specific specialists work full time with a basic salary payment 
and a civil servant status position (instead of former capitated part-time doctors). However, 
capitation formulas are progressively re-introduced in financing primary care albeit limited by the 
fact that doctors are  salaried and finance does not account for specialist referrals nor drug 
prescription costs (except in the case of Catalonia and Valencia for some geographical areas).  
 
A gate keeping system was formally set up in 1986 so that patients are asked to pursue GP 
referral to visit the specialists unless they make use of the emergency care. Interestingly, the former 
is the fastest growing item of expenditure, together with drugs, of the Spanish Health system. Spain 
has a surplus of health professionals, which doubles the UK ratio. However, public-private practice 
compatibility helps the depressed relative wages of active physicians, 70% employed in the NHS. 
Freedom of choice of primary care physicians within the same health area and some basic 
ambulatory specialists is allowed, but no much exercised.  
 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
 
Reforms in health care provision in Spain have lead  commonly to the development of 
regional agencies for health care purchasing with a semi-autonomous status (commonly public 
corporations) brought away from the Health Departments. Catalonia and the Basque country first 
instituted a sort of independent public body to coordinate the public coverage function while 
decentralising the purchasing at health care areas. A benchmark for this is split between pubic 
provision and public and private (non profit) production of health care in Catalonia where more than   8
half of the hospital activity publicly finances ‘non Social Security owned beds’ (see Figure 2). The 
implementation of a purchaser provider split in Catalonia had sound meaning, as almost two thirds of 
hospitals were private (non-profit) and as a result purchasing services from private sector hospitals 
were comprehensively integrated with few exceptions. A weighted health care unit (UBA) was 
designed by the Catalan system to measure hospital activity and reimburse hospitals, which was 
finally adapted by the Spanish Ministry of Health. During the mid nineties, Andalusia and the Basque 
Country introduced a semi-prospective payment system with DRG case-mix adjustment and 
Catalonia implemented in 1998 a new tool for paying hospitals that combined payment of both 
structure (approached by ‘Grade of membership’ classification Techniques)   and activity (DRG-
measured). In the nineties, INSALUD implemented a contractual system with the development of 
activity indicators and contracts tended to be linked to the regional health plans to improve 
efficiency.  
 
The Spanish hospital network is made up of approximately 800 hospitals largely dispersed 
among AC. With the exception of Catalonia, where just 36% of total beds are provided by public 
hospitals, the system is predominantly integrated (approximately 68% being publicly owned) although 
contracting out implies about a 15% of public expenditure (see figure 2). The majority of the staff is 
salaried employees and hospital payment has moved from retrospective to quite-prospective 
payment systems. Spain displays one of the lowest EU rations of hospital beds/1000 inhabitants. The 
average length of stay is about 9 days and the bed occupancy rate roughly 80%. The number of 
beds per 1000 inhabitants is 3.9 and inpatients admissions. Interestingly, the ageing process places its 
effects as the most frequent age cohort; whereas in 1982 discharges of people among 75 were 6.6% 
in 1998 they were 17.59%. Trends exhibit a reduction in acute beds and a small rise of long term 
care centres. F rom 1997 some few public hospitals are self-governed and from 1999 some other 
public hospitals have become independent agencies. This has caused trade unions complaints on 
differences on wage and working conditions, although there is no evidence on the effects of these 
changes on hospital performance yet [18]. 
 
Along with primary and inpatient care, the NHS funds 92% of the total pharmaceutical 
expenditure. Density of pharmacies is comparatively small and paid under margin basis. Regulation 
is based on a relatively recent reference pricing system although the weak generics penetration still 
limits its effectiveness in reducing expenditure. Other services are long term care and dental care.   9
Long term care coverage is limited and mostly means tested, regulated at the AC level and provided 
at the local level. Public home care is narrowly promoted (4% of total supply) and the involvement 
of the public sector financing in residential care is about 6.9% of total expenditure. Integration of 
health and social care is the prime difficulty, as far as social care is a responsibility of the social 
security and local authorities while regulation is regionally issued  [18]. Dental care is mainly 
provided by the private sector with the exception of some minor procedures (e.g., extractions). 
However, some regions have started to include coverage for dental care for children under a certain 
age (12 years) in their regional health care packages. 
 
Private health care plays a complementary role for the NHS when it does not provide 
coverage for certain services (e.g., dental care), fulfils the demand for quality of care (hospital hotel 
facilities and waiting list avoidance in primary care). Moreover, private provision is substituting NHS 
coverage, financed by public funds, for some civil servants, at no additional cost (see figure 2). The 
share of the population with these schemes shows a steady rise pattern from 1987 (12%) to 1992 
(14.5%) leading to 15.5% in 1997, and losing relative share at present (not in monetary terms given 
the constant increase in premiums. Up to 1999, a 15% tax relief in the personal income out of total 
private health expenditure was directly promoting private expenses on health care, including the 
purchasing of private health insurance and excluding luxury treatments (e.g., plastic surgery when 
this was not included in public benefits, or spa treatments).   
 
2.3 The resource allocation system  
 
Funds are centrally collected  -with the exception of Navarre and the Basque Country and 
some minor taxes for the remaining regions. Before 2002, the system has operated under a single 
central transfer. Once the Spanish Parliament determined the amount of health care expenditure in 
the National General Budget, expenditure was allocated to regions by means of a block grant 
according to a mostly unadjusted capitation formula. Although fiscal autonomy has been 
progressively increasing - by transferring 15 per cent of the personal income tax revenues collected 
in each AC in 1992, which later was raised to 30 per cent in 1997 plus a 20% surcharge on the 
personal income tax –, the vicious cycle of overspending (prevalent as normal practice both before 
and after devolution process) remained. The reasons for this included the lack of incentives to cut 
expenditure and the scarcely transparent bilateral agreement between the AC and the central state.    10
 
In 1994, the government unsuccessfully committed expenditure growth rates to GDP 
increases and imposed tighter conditions on extraordinary resources, by defining full regional 
responsibility for any overspending. However, this later provision was not credible due to the limited 
regional fiscal autonomy and regional political pressures for larger social spending. Furthermore, the 
distribution of funds depended on a quasi-capitation formula based on population size, barely taking 
into account demography, population density, or morbidity and mortality factors. In fact, the formula 
did not place its effects due to the establishment of a supplement to compensate those regions which 
decreasing p opulation and supplementary contributions for teaching and research and for cross-
boundary flows were improved.  
 
By 2002, a deeper structural reform was implemented, ending with the split of regional 
health care finance from the rest of the regional transfers, by inserting health care funding in the 
general regional resource allocation system. The new allocation formula weights the following 
features: population 75%, demographics (population over 65) 24.5% and insularity 0.5%, remarkably 
no health indicators are present yet  [7-8].  Furthermore, the agreement includes regional 
participation in the revenue of most of the centrally collected taxes - with the exception of the 
corporation income tax- with open-ended margins for complementary fiscal regional autonomy.  In 
particular, the funding system comes out in fixed proportion from personal income taxation actually 
collected in the AC (35%), VAT (40%) and taxes on petrol (40%) -both according to the estimated 
regional percentage of consumption-, and some other minor taxes (at 100%: specific tax, inheritance, 
property transfer and taxes on gambling). In addition, a new retailer petrol tax, earmarked to fund 
health care, may be optionally introduced by AC. Territorial equity is pursued by the set up of three 
mechanisms: a ‘cohesion fund’ to compensate cross boundary flows, a ‘sufficiency fund’ to ensure 
a minimum financial capacity and ‘an equalisation fund’ to contain regional diversity. In order to 
preserve cohesion by avoiding ‘excessive’ deviation in per capita health spending amongst regions, 
central transfers will help those AC that show increases in public health coverage (say due to legal 
immigration) three points above the Spanish average.  
 
2.4 Decentralisation and competition structure 
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The decentralised design of a NHS is often grounded on the expected efficiency gains both 
in the production and allocation of resources, larger incentives for policy innovation, better 
responsiveness to citizens’ demand and greater political accountability. However, conflicts refer to 
the extent to which a NHS should limit ‘regional diversity’ resulting from differences in funds and 
resources. Ideally, a decentralised NHS should define the “minimum” set of benefits and implicitly 
enable regions to develop additional coverage at the expense of their own fiscal effort, thus 
transferring risk management to regions. Heterogeneous health expenditure might then result only 
from differences in clinical practices and central priorities in health care allocation from the past. No 
margins for regional autonomy in finance were allowed. Therefore, the (inter-regional) competition 
structure of the Spanish NHS before 2002 promoted political accountability better than fiscal 
accountability. This has changed after 2002; a floor on health expenditures is established, but 
regional resources can add up to the former amount according to the evolution of total regional 
finance and parliament priorities in health care. 
 
Generally speaking, responsibilities in regional health provision have markedly developed as a 
“learning by doing” process [4] which appears to foster positive externalities, basically in improving 
health care delivery [7] and thus fuelling health care expenditure which in turn casts some doubts on 
the sustainability of the health care funding. Moreover, inter-regional patient flows are negligible to 
promote horizontal competition structures and regional responsibilities for health care are still 
sensibly unclear in many areas. Therefore, regions have strong incentives to vertically compete with 
the central state for the regulation and funding of regional health services by undertaking policy 
innovation  [4]. In this setting the health system objectives may arguably need to be accommodated. 
Furthermore, due to the political visibility  of health care policy, innovation has been horizontally 
disseminated (in the form of positive spillovers) to other regions through a process of policy imitation, 
thus it is likely that inequalities both in inputs but especially in outcomes may not increase over time.  
 
Before 2002, AC funds were the result of a political bargaining between the central and the 
regional Departments of Health. However, after 2002, the bargaining will be shifted between 
Finance Ministers first and secondly, at the regional internal level, between the regional expenditure 
ministers within each AC. The regional parliaments will now have a more decisive ultimate word on 
heath policy issues. If we add to this a larger discretion of regional funding – based on own regional 
taxes, surcharges of central taxes and revenue sharing of central taxation- we should expect to open   12
the floor for resource allocation diversity in the future. The central state requirements is a minimum 
departure amount (defined by regional expenses at the point of transfer), a minimum rate of increase 
centrally determined given the revenue increases plus an extraordinary vertical levelling fund, to be 
implemented in future according to the differential evolution of the population covered by the 
regions. Finally, a Cohesion Fund to be funded by the central budget –so far with a low starting 
amount will devote resources to subsidise cross boundary flows of patients amongst regions.  
 
Some caveats exist on how the central state will compensate for new central regulations or 
pricing policies (new drugs to be reimbursed, and centrally authorised new health technologies 
among other) that affect regional expenses. A defined basic entitlement package will become a 
necessity if patients are not to exploit differences.  Diversity itself should not be a cause for concern, 
provided the basic minimum package is covered, any additions are financed from regional sources 
and a perequalisation system exists in order to match basic expenditure needs and regional fiscal 
capacity.  Handling other variations in policy, such as those applied to drugs, may not be 
straightforward.  Although regions will not negotiate drug prices by themselves, they may well 
influence the prescribing habits of their professionals.  This will pose new challenges to the 
marketing departments of drug companies.   
 
2.5 Trends in expenditure and expenditure determinants 
 
Health care expenditure accounts for 7.5 per cent of the GDP with approximately three 
quarters (5.5 per cent) corresponding to public expenditure and a quarter (2.1 per cent) to private 
expenditure (see Table 1). Furthermore, health care accounts on average about 40 per cent of 
regional expenditure, although health expenditure relative to regional GDP varies from 3.6% 
Balearic Islands to 7.5% in Extremadura.  Individuals can supplement the NHS by purchasing 
private health insurance (PHI), covering mainly primary care and hospital amenities on fixed 
providers’ list [9-10].  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
One of the most recurrent issues in examining health systems refers, indeed, to whether the 
NHS is over (under) financed and how health care expenditure evolves with income. Spain’s share   13
of health spending in 1980 was one of the smallest among other European NHS (Table 2) and it 
remained practically unaltered along the eighties until 1988 that it went up to 6.1 %, surpassing the 
UK and equalling Portugal the year after, Ireland (6.4%) in 1990 and surpassing Finland in 1995 
(7.7%). From then on, it remained practically constant. Thus, in the last two decades there has been 
a steady increase in the per capita resources devoted to health care. Spain expends more than 
Finland (7.7%), Ireland (7%) and the United Kingdom (7%) at the time they had the same GDP per 
capita that Spain has today. Moreover, on the basis of our calculation, income elasticity during the 
eighties (1980-1989) was 1.31, during the first nineties (1990-1995) rose to 1.84 and the last nineties 
(1996-2000) dropped to 1.24. Therefore, from this simple analysis it cannot be concluded that health 
care in Spain behaves as a luxury good. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
When examining health expenditure layers, main highlights are that whereas inpatient care 
increased significantly during the eighties, in the nineties relative expenditure decreased, m ainly 
thanks to contracting out systems, as well as reforms in the primary care sector (see data on 
Appendix A1-A2). From the first nineties we find that about 55% is spent on inpatient and 
specialised care, 16% is devoted to primary care, research and public health account for 4%, and 
pharmaceuticals have been steadily rising from 18% in mid nineties to 23% in 2002. Outpatient 
expenditure remained stable, always lower than 1% of the GDP. During the period 1986-1992 
relative pharmaceutical expenditure raised 40%. The average costs by receipt, due to the 
progressive reduction of effective co-payments from 1980’s, reflect this feature. Interestingly, due to 
the co-payment system, the share of public pharmaceutical expenditure by pensioners has raised 
steadily  being 39.2% in 1980, and almost twice at present. Prevention still represents a negligible 
magnitude (0.1% of the GDP) remaining constant across the period. Expenditure on personal was 
moderately around 4 -5% of the GDP during the eighties, however after the implementation of the 
primary care reform and the regional devolution of health care, it went up to the 7%.  
 
Prices in the health sector have been slightly higher than those in the rest of the economy 
though the differential was not increasingly wide. T herefore, other determinants are behind the 
health expenditure rise. They include health care coverage, the ageing process and especially 
significant changes in utilisation patterns. Although there is some methodological debate [11-13],   14
evidence from prior studies [14-15] highlights that whereas during the period from 1980-1986 prices 
where the main driver of health expenditure, from 1987 onwards it was utilisation what pushed 
health expenditure to increase. The ageing process and the coverage played all over the period a 
marginal role. In this study we have followed the decomposition methodology discussed in those 
previous studies [15]. Although there were considerable differences in health care prices among 
AC, 1995 and 1999 were the years where the share of real utilisation was higher (see Appendix 
A3).  The effect of ageing was larger in Catalonia, Canary Islands and Murcia and price changes 
were significantly uncoordinated among AC.  Finally, a fixed effects panel data model looking at the 
determinants o f public health expenditure at the regional level highlighted that the income elasticity 
for the period 1992-1999 was close to unity. As expected, ageing, measured as the dependency 
ratio, pushed up expenditure and population displayed a negative coefficient showing some evidence 
of scale effects (see Appendix A4).  
 
Alongside public expenditure, the composition of private health care expenditure has 
significantly shifted from 1980 to 1995  [16-17]. Dental care mostly not covered by the NHS, 
accounted for 17% of private expenditure in 1980, increased in 1990 (30%) and accounted for 27% 
of total private expenditure latter on. In contrast, the progressive reduction in pharmaceutical co-
payments (effective co-payment was about 18% in 1980, declined to 11% in 1990 and in 2000 is 
about 8%) lead to out-of -pocket drugs expenditure to decline its share of  private health expenditure 
from 36% in 1980 to 18% in 1990 and 27% in 1995. Out-of pocket medical care declined in the 
eighties from 22% to 13%, mainly due to the extension of primary care and the expansion of public 
coverage and then remained roughly constant until 1995. Finally, private health insurance coverage 
went from 14 to 11% between 1980 and 1995, growing less rapidly from 1992 onwards when five 
regions achieved health care responsibilities.  
 
Once we introduce the regional dimension of the system performance, we find that 
remarkable features pointing out significant cross-regional differences in the expansion of the private 
sector. Following the Leviathan hypothesis, we should expect private health expenditure rises due to 
the devolution process. However, existing evidence suggests an ambiguous effects pointing out a 
somewhat reversal effect  [4]. Overall, the decline of total real health expenditure was 31% in 
devolved regions and 16% in INSALUD regions. However, per capita total (and public) health 
expenditure was larger in the two fiscally as well as politically accountable regions (Navarre and the   15
Basque Country). Comparing data from 1990-1998 from the Continuous Household Survey we find 
that private health expenditure in real terms increased by three times in INSALUD regions such as 
Aragon (14%), Murcia and Castilla-Leon (1%) although in some regions with devolved 
responsibilities such as Andalusia (11%), the latest due to the weak role of private sector before 
decentralisation. The main increases of real private expenditure were in some AC run at the time by 
INSALUD such as Balearic Islands (90%), Cantabria (20%) and Asturias (22%). 
 
3. Efficiency  
 
3.1 At the macro level  
 
Compared to other NHS countries, Spain ranks in a middle situation in health spending, once 
health expenditure is regressed on GDP it places in the exact point of the fitted line.  In terms of 
overall performance it is fifth in the WHO table. This suggests that ‘good value for money’ seems 
then to be achieved at the aggregate level. In the past, health care reforms have tended to focus on 
cost-containment –mainly by defining positive and negative drug lists - but hardly ever there is an 
explicit assessment on what the health system buys. Cost containment goals lead to the definition of 
the basic package of benefits covered by the Spanish NHS. This was defined as distinguishing 
primary care, specialised care, pharmaceutical benefits and finally complementary benefits (i.e 
prostheses, orthopaedic products, etc). As a result of this definition, some benefits were implicitly 
excluded from coverage, such as some mental health treatments and diagnosis tests (psychoanalysis 
and hypnosis) and dental care (although Navarre and the Basque Country do provide some 
additional coverage), sex-change treatments (explicitly covered in Andalusia), regular health checks 
or plastic surgery.  The (implicit) package does not include social nor community care. Some low 
therapeutic value drugs are excluded too (in this case in an explicit way). 
 
3.2 Organisational Innovation 
 
The Spanish system may be briefly characterized for the former purpose as follows:    16
(i)  Physicians are civil servants, with salaries defined homogeneously in annual central budgets, 
with protected  employment  for life and a sense of  clinical autonomy  evidenced by unjustifiable 
variations in clinical practice.  
(ii)  Administrators of the  health  units have to manage resources under the limitation  from 
restrictive administrative rules to control fraud and  with tentative budgets that are retrospective, 
according to the capability of the manager facing the funder.  
(iii)  Patients/ citizens have a small sense of commitment to the health authority or community, 
other than to their local doctors. 
 
In Spain the efforts for changing the present situation include 
 1- The introduction of a variable component in wage payment of physicians according to 
productivity (ultimately incorporated linearly into the basic salary); 
2- A purchase-provider split with Program Budget Contract (Insalud  since1992), which has proved 
to be  illusory when provider and purchaser are both public agents (under centralized retrospective 
budgets);  
3- Free choice of doctors by patients, in some cases with the ‘ratchet effect’ that, under salaried 
primary care physicians’ systems, this has meant lower work load without lower remuneration;  
4- More ‘accurate’ payment systems for hospitals based on ‘needed’ activity, with the illusion that 
‘worse’ (more activity) prognoses are ‘better’ for the institution;  
5- And of course, organizational change. 
The Catalan mirror 
 
Catalonia, with 6 million residents, a strong sense of autonomous community and concern for 
self-governance, runs as commented its own health care services and offers a variety of initiatives 
for organisational reforms.  Municipalities, Churches, and private wealth endowments–or the so 
called ‘civil society’- in social care, complement the initially poor public health care network. At 
present,  the majority of hospital care s ervices are provided by  a publicly financed  network of 
hospitals, with 60% of the beds out of social security management. Most of these hospitals (16 
important ones) are ‘public consortia’ of territorial interests (municipalities and provinces), open to 
private non-profit participation. In addition, some private  foundations are also licensed for public 
provision. This allows health authorities to take advantage of the situation by contracting out on the   17
basis of hospital activity instead of just reimbursing actual expenses. No discrimination between 
patients is formally possible within the Public Network and in practice, risk selection has never been 
an issue to-date, despite the fact that the four largest and more complex hospitals are social security 
hospitals and capable of dealing with patients with more severe illness.  
 
In Catalonia,  consortia and foundations work under their own management rules. These are rather 
different  from  the administrative common constraints of the remaining Spanish social security 
institutions.  Indeed, the employment policies, managerial charts and internal operating rules of the 
hospital  consortia  are defined by the principle on which they have been created (or changed 
afterwards by common agreement). This reflects  in  (i) the way they purchase inputs (following 
private law);  (ii) how  they contract professionals (out of the civil servants regime) and set their 
working conditions (more flexible, with in and out-of-hospital greater compatibility of public -private 
practices if convenient); (iii)  the capability to create pure private instrumental organizations for 
achieving the consortia interests (provision of care for private insurers).  
With  more autonomy, they own their assets, their finances are publicly controlled ex -post and not ex 
–ante, and they are governed by  representatives of the community subject to a lower degree of 
political influence. So far, their management has proved to be  robust to political changes. The 
‘associated group of interests’ is usually chaired by a member of the local community with no direct 
involvement either in politics or in the health care business.   
 
In a similar way, Hospital Foundations (8 important ones) are actually private organizations 
given the rules on which they operate, but under a public protectorate. Their  governing  body is 
commonly open to  representatives of the civil society who risk their reputation and assume legal 
responsibilities for the privilege of leadership. Foundations own their assets and operate under the 
private law in all the aspects of their activity. They may borrow freely in the private market. If they 
are contracted out by the Catalan authority, given their non-profit status, they need to be licensed 
and monitored by the public regulator in a similar way as consortia are. 
  
  In addition to this, in the organization of Primary Care services, The Nationalist Party, which 
has been in power for more than 20 years in Catalonia has also avoided opening new Health Area 
Teams under the old administrative rules.  Fourteen experiments are run  currently  with self- 
employed physicians, either under ‘Co-operative’ organizational forms or Limited Responsibility   18
Corporations for well-delimited geographical Health Areas. These new teams are financed on 
capitation grounds, with some elective inpatient care usually being included, and with notional 
agreements on drug prescription costs. This means in reality that primary care in these new areas is 
just ‘indirectly’ publicly managed. These health areas have being awarded  a license (recently open 
to free choice of different providers) and they  decide on working conditions, budget surplus, 
incentives on peer controls and salaries. They offer a more extended working hours and some of 
them offer community premia or direct prices for some additional services (minor, so far), out of the 
public ‘catalogue’ (such as some treatments for dental care, podiatry, etc.).  
 
Co-operatives and Organizations on a Voluntary Basis (Limited Responsibility Co) can be 
created by professionals of the NHS. The assets of these organizations, at least in a 51% have to be 
in hands of these professionals. None of them may own more than a 25%, and share-holding is 
prohibited for Co-operatives. Physicians who accept  a  change  in  status from the former social 
security primary care teams to the new forms do not lose their job in the public system for a certain 
period but they do not have their particular post ‘reserved.’ These organizations are subject to 
private law, they own their own assets, sometimes financially supported indirectly by the Royal 
College of Physicians, which offer a sort of leasing contract to professionals willing to assume some 
financial risk and managerial autonomy. Needless to say  those physicians who have left the old 
regime are a biased sample, since they are usually more committed to the public provision of health 
care (no private practice is there), have greater motivation (they are young) and  are probably tired 
of the old rules in which ‘someone from outside tells you what to do, and you get the same payment 
irrespective of the effort you put into the team’. 
 
Finally, during the last three years, the Catalan Health Authority has offered, on a voluntary 
association basis,  a  capitation regime to 5 larger regions (7% of the Catalan population). This 
provides new organizational frameworks for  health care integration on a regional basis. In this 
context, several providers with diversified status, different organizational forms, different positions in 
primary, hospital and  long term care integrate their equipment and co-ordinate strategies for fulfilling 
the Catalan Health Plan’s objectives with a larger sense of autonomy. No loss of finance comes out 
of reducing activity, a more efficient co-ordination of primary and hospital care, inpatient versus 
outpatient care or ambulatory surgery, or by reducing the costs of prescription drugs, since they are   19
financed on a risk-adjusted population basis. Despite the fact that extending the system to the large 
metropolitan area of Barcelona seems impossible, the first evaluation results recently published by 
the Generalitat of Catalonia are encouraging. At any rate, this new Catalan pilot experiment on 
capitation follows the strategy of not  creating  hierarchically-uniform health providers;  awards 
greater autonomy to providers (extended internally within their institutions); and pushes for a better 
co-ordination  of health care facilities and health strategies in what they achieve in terms of health 
outcomes. 
The Spanish experience 
 
The Spanish version of the efforts for implementing  organizational changes in health care 
are limited up today to  Foundation Hospitals for new hospitals and the so called ‘Hospital Public 
Foundations’ for the already existing hospitals. Given the lack of tradition and the absence of political 
commitment on these proposals both remain in ‘limbo’: just four in all the Spanish geography for the 
first, and zero for those of the second type.  
 
Indeed, following the existing general Law for the Creation of Private Foundations (1994), 
the Spanish Government passed in 1996 a bill for the creation of new  small to medium sized 
hospitals. These are  all  public foundations that have adopted the existing private regulation for 
foundations in trying to escape from the public administration rules.  These rules allow employment 
of  staff according to general labor legislation, purchasing supplies under private law,  and  less 
intervention by allowing ex -post control of expenditure, private accountancy rules, etc.  However, 
public and private are mixed and confused in practice. For instance, the ‘ Protectorado’ (the 
supervisory body) and ‘Patronato’ (the administration body) are both under the same hands (to-date 
Insalud, the central health  authority). There is not a separate endowment for Foundation expenses 
(the equipment, which results from the public investment) and in deciding current revenues, the 
financer  sits on all the management boards, appointing managers and representatives in the 
‘Patronato’.  
 
This  was the case up to January of 2002 when INSALUD  ran health care for 12 
autonomous  communities with no regional transfers since it was reluctant to open the governing 
bodies of these hospitals to regional or local Authorities with different political colour. This has had   20
the side effect of putting private foundations in the political debate, not just by those claiming that this 
leads to the privatisation of health care, but also by others for partisan reasons. 
 
   Today, all the Regional Authorities run health care in Spain, and it is interesting to observe 
that despite past criticisms, neither changes in hospital status nor seats on the governing boards have 
occurred in the existing Foundations. They are probably here to stay, although we still do not have a 
well accepted evaluation of  Hospital Foundations.  At any rate these Foundations have raised 
expectations for change, which would be ruined if no support were shown in the future. More highly 
motivated, better paid doctors  with less private practice and access to new equipment shape a new 
type of public management culture beyond this organizational change. 
 
Finally, specific legislation for Public Foundations was introduced in the Budget Law in 1999, 
under strong political disagreement of medical trade unions and parties in opposition. The changes 
did not affect, in any case, the pre-existing employment rights and had to be accepted on a voluntary 
basis by health professionals. Finally, some changes in the Conservative Party put all the efforts of 
the former Minister of Health, after a large and sordid political debate, in a closed box. Today, these 
type of Foundations sleep also in the ‘limbo’ of the Spanish Health Reform.  
 
3.3Evidence from efficiency studies 
 
Unlike other countries, there is no systematic independent public review on the efficiency of 
health care organizations in Spain.  Non-systematic exceptions are the reviews undertaken by the 
Society for Public Health and Health Services Administration (SESPAS) and the regular surveys 
from the Annual meetings of the Spanish Health Economics Association (AES). Since 2003 an 
Observatory of the Spanish Health System is reporting on the evolution of the main health care 
indicators on a regional basis. 
 
In the managerial arena the so called Top-20 Report on Spanish Hospitals, includes an 
evaluation of 140 hospitals on voluntary bases although questioned in what regards the information 
systems employed and the exclusive focus on production rather than access and need  [20]. The 
latest attempts to capture the evolution of the efficiency in the Spanish health care system [20-21] 
focus on relative measures of efficiency in hospitals and primary health care, along with factors   21
explaining variations in efficiency levels and changes in total factor productivity. Here we distinguish 
studies on hospital and primary care efficiency.   
 
Generally speaking efficiency studies are not commonly standardised in the international 
arena, and neither they are in Spain. Therefore, here we revise those that offer results with 
significant policy implications  [18, 22-37].  Some evidence using frontier models suggests that 
privately funded hospitals improve allocative efficiency better than public and non-for profit hospitals 
[24] and among these more diversified hospitals were relatively more efficient [25]. Other studies 
using the Malmquist index  [26-28] find a reduction on factor productivity over the period 1993-1995 
although a more recent study based on a 1995-1999 sample [29] reveals remarkable productivity 
increases in the later period (1995-1999) in Andalusia. A  cross comparison between the Basque 
country, Catalonia and Andalusia [30] finds that most efficient hospitals are those exhibiting a larger 
size and those displaying the highest number of nurses per bed.  Studies on the efficiency of 
INSALUD hospitals suggest that the major cause of allocative inefficiency is the excess of labour in 
the cost composite [31] as well as hospital size and those contracting out certain health care inputs. 
At the organisation level, studies on hospital efficiency in Catalonia highlight a direct relationship with 
scale and complexity. Some other studies point out that teaching hospitals are less efficient than the 
others [32] that a major cause is the excess proportion of highly qualified professionals [33-34]. 
Least efficient INSALUD hospitals are those with high activity, low diversification, low-tech capital, 
but at least one specialty department [35]. Remarkable results suggest that a potential reduction on 
waiting lists could follow from a better control on the length of stay [36]. Finally, contracting out is 
identified as a major cause of relative technical efficiency [18, 37].  
 
Efficiency studies in primary care should be treated with some caution as far as almost all 
studies used Data Envelopment Analysis and hardly ever deal with allocative efficiency. Results of 
the studies vary from a technical efficiency of 0.73 or 0.87 for PC teams in Madrid  [38], 0.51 in 
Aragón  [39], 0.87 in Navarre [40] and 0.91 in Catalonia [41], thus exhibiting important regional 
variation in technical efficiency. More recently some data came from the evaluation of the 
organisational innovations in Catalonia, showing better results than those for the old civil servants 
regime. Better indicators were in the New Teams of GPs for the average waiting time for a visit 
(less that one day in a 40% of the cases, 68% in 2 days), for a better access to paediatric care after   22
5 pm (children leave the school at this hour), more continuity in health care (by overlapping working 
schedules along the day) with indicators of satisfaction for this three times higher for the new teams 
than for the traditional forms. Similar good indicators for the new organisational forms against the old 
ones refer to a lower utilisation of antibiotics for some common viral flu (11% of the cases against 
31%) and for gastroenteritis (6% of the cases against 17%). Some adjustment is needed before 
assessing the meaning of lower prescription costs, despite similar total costs per capita/year, of 
lower referrals (22% of the cases against 33%) and a lower number of visits per inhabitant year 
(5.3% against 6.8%) [58].  
 
Indicators measuring clinical quality of care reveal ambiguous results. The share of 
caesarean section over all obstetric deliveries suggests a rise from 17.3% in 1993 to 21.7% in 2000. 
Surgical activity displays a significant raise from 7 interventions per 1000 inhabitants in 1995 to 16.4 
in 2000. However, the number of transplants undertaken has increased from 1488 in 1993 to 2032 in 
2000. 
 
In assessing performance of hospital organisational diversity in Catalonia, it appears that the 
cost of activity, case-mix adjusted, of these Hospital Foundations is clearly below that of the largest 
social security hospitals. This has reflected lower salaries for their staff, which in turn reflect more 
flexible working conditions.  Hospital Consortia and Hospital Foundations are  widespread in 
Catalonia and their status and community representation has proved resistant so far to changing 
political forces in the local constituencies. 
 
In the primary health care arena, evaluation of the changes in Catalonia performed by The 
Donabedian Foundation for Quality Assessment and the Royal College of Physicians of Barcelona 
have offered first evaluations of the experiments with rather satisfactory results either on health 
care access, efficiency and local citizens’ satisfaction. This is basically linked to a more continuous 
access to the teams (open  after five o’clock) and the sense of membership of an innovative group 
with new equipment, with respect to  those units managed by the Catalan Institute for Health (the 
majority  of primary care teams). More specifically, new organisational innovations in Catalonia, 
against the old civil servants regime show better indicators were in the New Teams of GPs for the 
average waiting time for a visit (less that one day in a 40% of the cases, 68% in 2 days), for a 
better access to paediatric care after 5 pm (children leave the school at this hour), more continuity   23
in health care (by overlapping working schedules along the day) with indicators of satisfaction for 
this three times higher for the new teams than for the traditional forms. Similar good indicators for 
the new organisational forms against the old ones refer to a lower utilisation of antibiotics for some 
common viral flu (11% of the cases against 31%) and for gastroenteritis (6% of the cases against 
17%). Some adjustment is needed before assessing the meaning of lower prescription costs, despite 
similar total costs per capita/year, of lower referrals (22% of the cases against 33%) and a lower 
number of visits per inhabitant year (5.3% against 6.8%)
2. 
 
Of course all these changes involve some potential risks  still not confirmed in practice 
(higher transaction costs, violation of some minimum risk pools, cultural values against profit 
incentives and budget surplus in health care provision) and create a political response by those who 
prefer the old system and accuse the Catalan government of privatising health care. Since public 
finance and public regulation are maintained, these claims are difficult to sustain. The absence of 
non profit bureaucratic provision  does not mean  that a preference for consumers or social goals is 
absent, since consumer surplus may be lost by larger production costs under pure public production. 
Limited for profit incentives  do not mean patients’ welfare exploitation by producers when free 
choice and non-territorial monopolies are present.  Furthermore, the job of the regulator needs to be 
more responsive  and alert because its mistakes will be  more apparent than the mistakes on 
hierarchical ruling of public organizations. 
 
In short, despite the fact that the Catalonian Health System can show a rather successful 
record in institutional innovations in health care,  organizational change is a very limited strategy for 
health care reforms in public systems.  It is not a surrogate for the necessary clarification of the 
extent of the private sector involvement in public health care, nor a substitute for an open discussion 
on its adequate mix of public and private finance. 
 
3.4 Micro-efficiency and regional heterogeneity 
 
                                                 
2 Fundacion Avedis Donabedian. 2003. Mimeo for The Catalan Health Service 
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Several layers as the rise of relative health care prices, adoption of “expensive” new 
technologies and health care intensity influence efficiency. Therefore, an issue to examine is 
whether there are significant differences in health care resources across AC, especially capital and 
labour inputs and technology available. Beginning by capital, Cantabria (5.7) and Catalonia (5) 
display the highest number of beds by 1000 population, while Andalusia (3.26) and Valencia (3) have 
the smallest rate. This reveals that differences in the beds rate by 1000 inhabitants cannot be 
regarded to decentralisation; the coefficient of variation (CV) was the same across all regions. 
However, significant differences were found in the public-private fix of beds, 82% of beds were in 
publicly owned INSALUD hospitals in contrast to 32% in Catalonia. Hospital infrastructure 
evidence shows that only 20% of hospitals in Catalonia are public (46% are general hospitals, 5% 
mental hospitals and 30% are nursing homes) and one third in Basque Country (58% are general 
hospitals, 16% mental hospitals and 18% nursing homes), Balearic Islands (72% are general 
hospitals) and Madrid (44% are general hospitals, 12% are mental health hospitals and 10% are 
nursing homes). In the last three, about two thirds of the beds were provided by public institutions, 
indicating the presence of small private centres.  
 
Despite differences in size,  there are significant differences in hospital specialisation. 
Commonly, the richer the AC is, the larger the number of small and specialised hospitals. Regarding 
labour inputs Navarre and Madrid concentrate the largest physician density, as they are areas with 
large activity and huge hospitals whilst poorer AC concentrate less physicians. Once more, 
heterogeneity cannot be regarded to devolution as inequality within INSALUD regions was higher 
that the rest. Nurse density rate was higher for AC with devolved responsibilities. An additional 
source of regional heterogeneity is technology equipment. Catalonia, Madrid, Valencia and 
Andalusia concentrate more than 50% of equipment in hospitals.  
 
When examining the rate of technology we found that X-Rays are highly used in the Basque 
Country (0.64) and La Rioja (0.61) whereas in Madrid or Galicia showed a lower use. These come 
out not only from differences in availability but from variations in clinical practice. Navarre and 
Basque Country have higher use of Computerised Axial Tomography. Madrid, Navarre and Balearic 
Islands show higher rates of Nuclear Magnetic Resonance and Andalusia, Castilla y Leon and 
Murcia exhibited higher rates of homodynamic rooms’ use. Interestingly, INSALUD regions 
experience a higher variability than the rest. The same applies to gammographies and digital   25
angiographies. Rates of biopsies are similar across the two types of AC, but again some regions as 
Galicia and Murcia show three times higher rates than Balearic Islands and Canaries. 
  
Decentralisation in the nineties brought to significant reduction in the length of stay in 
Andalusia (33%), Basque Country and Catalonia (23%) and a rise in the number of patients treated 
and the level of health care contracted-out  [42]. Activity indicators show significant regional 
heterogeneity and display higher variability when compared to INSALUD regions. The average 
length of stay in the whole country reduced from 9.2 in 1992 to 7.61 in 1999. Regional heterogeneity 
is 8 or less in Balearic Islands, Andalusia and Valencia while about 12 in Canary Islands and Castilla 
Leon. Occupancy rates are over 80% in Catalonia, Cantabria, Canary Islands and the Basque 
Country whereas about 75% in Andalusia, Balearic Islands and La Rioja.  Rotation and substitution 
do not significantly vary across AC. The use of urgency care (the share of urgencies from total 
consultancies) is large in Catalonia and Balearic Islands while Canary Islands and Galicia and 
INSALUD regions showed less variability that the rest.   
 
There is very little evidence on the variability in clinical practice in Spain and most of it is 
very recent [43]. Evidence shows that inter-regional differences in hospital attendance are small 
although there is variability when accounting for specific processes  [44-46]. In fact, surgery 
intervention heterogeneity is higher than the one found between regions. However, when specific 
studies are examined, we find that that cataract’s interventions range from 4.3 per 1000 inhabitants 
(Galicia) to 9.8 in Catalonia or 9 in Andalusia, Basque Country and Extremadura. The same applies 
to prostate intervention (benign hyperplasic) where ratios vary from 5.6 per 1000 in Aragón, 
Valencia or Murcia to 11.2 in Catalonia or 10.4 in Rioja (Company et al, 1995). The implications of 
clinical variability are large, a study [47] finds that over a set of 20 interventions, if the cheapest 
practice would have been implemented across the NHS, this would imply saving 16 additional million 
euros a year.   
 
4. Inequality 
4.1 Health outcomes and avoidable mortality 
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As other developed countries, Spain has experienced a very significant improvement in 
health during these decades (Tables 3 and 4). In 2000 the mortality rate was about 9.35 per 1000 
inhabitants. Life expectancy in Spain is 75.6 years in males and 82.9 in females in 2001 and has 
experienced a steady increased 5.46 years since 1975. Consequently, this has brought a rise in the 
share of the elderly, now being 15% of the population and is expected to rise 39% in the next thirty 
years. In Spain the baby boom started a decade later. As Costa et al [56] highlight, life expectancy 
in 2002 was higher both in males and female than Germany, Italy and the UK.  However, life 
expectancy is subject to regional heterogeneity as well being the highest in Castilla-Leon (76.3 in 
male and 83.2 in female) and Madrid (75 and 83 respectively) and the lowest Balearic Islands (73.2 
and 81.1) and Andalusia (73.5 and 80.7) for both male and female. Navarre (4%) and the Basque 
Country (3%) improved their life e xpectancy in the eighties when they were not yet politically 
accountable for health care.  From 1990- 95 there seems to be a convergence in life expectancy 
growth at a 1.2%.    
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
 
Table 3 highlights that, indeed, Spain is a heterogeneous country in health outcomes, although 
the coefficient of variation is not large for most of the indicators available. Interestingly, this table 
suggests that by distinguishing those regions with devolved responsibilities from those traditionally 
centrally managed does not result significant difference in health outcomes.  Looking at avoidable 
mortality as termed in Spain [48], Table 3 reports estimations on avoidable age-gender standardised 
premature mortality for 1998. Estimates suggest that although there is a north-south pattern, not 
related to regional health care expenditure, some regions as Catalonia perform better in both 
measures of premature mortality whereas some others Basque Country expedience low mortality 
for health policy related diseases and large mortality for health service related diseases.  
4.2 Socio-economic inequalities in health and health care 
 
An important issue when examining the impact of health care system reforms in NHS 
countries is the effect of specific policies on influencing social cohesion and the extent in which the   27
health system reduces the barriers to health care of the most disadvantaged. Several studies, testing 
whether position explains health care utilisation, controlling by social n eed, show that there have 
been considerable variations in inequality indicators of health care delivery. Data for 1987 showed 
that inequalities in the delivery of health care are moderately ‘pro-rich’ [49]. However, more recent 
studies [50-51] using health surveys from 1987-1997 find small inequalities in access to health care 
When examining inequalities in health outcomes, several studies evidence that there is a socio-
economic vector which explains differences in adjusted mortality, prevalence and self -reported 
health status  [52]. Finally, regarding progresivity of health expenditure, around a quarter of total 
financing refers to indirect taxation (which is well known to be regressive) and the remaining 
financed through direct taxes. The combination of both sources shows that the financing system has 
become less progressive [53].  
 
4.3 Inter-regional health and health care inequalities 
 
Devolution often raises concerns on the impact of diversity on social cohesion. From 1986 to 
1999/2000 patterns of interregional inequalities in per capita health expenditure describe a non-
monotonic trend where the Coefficient of Variation (CV) rises up to a value of 0.13 where there is 
no significant difference between AC with devolved and non-devolved responsibilities (Figure 3). 
Furthermore, some inequality appears in how health systems manage their outpatient and impatient 
expenditure.  Inequalities in mortality and potential years lost seem to evolve following a similar 
pattern between AC regardless health care responsibilities. Furthermore, INSALUD regions show 
slightly larger inequalities in avoidable mortality in 1998 both in health care (CV=0.22) and health 
policy (CV=0.19). The same applies when the coefficient of variation is computed for inpatient 
doctors. No statistically significant correlation was found between inequalities in health expenditure 
and inequalities in health outcomes indicators.  The CV of physicians working in hospitals decreased 
from being 0.26 in 1980 to 0.24 in 1990 to vales of 0.14 in 1992 and 0.12 in 1995. Inequalities within 
INSALUD regions again were larger.  The correlation between per capita health expenditure and 
inequalities in resource physicians’ availability was 0.082 (p>0.05). Regional inequalities in health 
care have shown to be positively correlated with per capita health expenditure ( r= 0.71, p<0.05) 
whereas no statistically significant correlation coefficients were identified with regional inequalities in 
mortality for all AC.  The same applies for only those regions with centralised health care 
responsibilities, although the correlation coefficient between inequalities in that case is larger (r=0.92   28
p<0.01). Inter-regional inequalities in health (measured in terms of mortality and potential years of 
life lost) show a similar declining pattern among regions and when the correlation coefficient was 
never significant from 1992 to 1999.    
 
[Insert Figure 3 about here] 
 
The ‘other face of the toss’ concerns the territorial equity of NHS funding. To these end, a 
so-called distribution  vector is obtained as the difference between the allocation of revenues and 
spending benefits among AC [53]. This highlights the extent to which specific regions contribute to 
fiscal redistribution more than its income. Interestingly, Catalonia and Balearic Islands are the ones 
distributing that should receive more, taking into account their income, and with a different extent 
(due to the ‘capitality of the State’ factor) are followed by Madrid. In the other extreme, there is 
Navarre, Extremadura and Andalusia that receive far more of what they contribute. The explanation 
for this falls in that Navarre has a special fiscal status and Andalusia and Extremadura are the 
poorest Spanish AC in terms of income per capita. Conversely, Catalonia and Balearic Islands are 
among the richest and are not fiscally accountable (with the exception of small taxes).   
 
4.4 Intra-regional health inequalities 
 
Other than focussing on inter-regions inequalities, one of the largest concerns is the 
existence of intra-regional disparities. We do not have generally good studies on the estimation of 
intra-regional disparities and their determinants. Geographic patterns of mortality seem to highlight 
some spatial distribution of mortality linked to the variation in social and environmental feature. Small 
areas so-called ‘zones” where constructed in this purpose to study the distribution of the 
comparative mortality ratio (CMR) [54]. Out of eight AC with ratios above 100, six were located in 
the south of Spain. However, by examining the d ifference between the maximum CMR and 
minimum it is found that the largest difference is in Valencia and Canary Islands and the smallest 
difference is identified in La Rioja, Navarre, Asturias and Cantabria. Therefore, it can be argued 
that large inequalities within small areas of specific AC still remain.  Other dimensions of intra-
regional inequalities refers to differences in resources, being the lowest in the Basque Country 
(CV=0.16) what could be attributed to the significant rise in public inpatient care and the success in   29
extending the primary care reform. The opposite apply to Catalonia with high variability in outpatient 
care (CV=0.6) where the primary care reform was slower.   
4.5 The association between inputs, outputs and outcomes 
 
Available data (1985-1999, table 5) do not show any positive correlation between 
expenditure per capita and relative supply of beds (r=-0.05 p>0.05) nor with physician concentration 
(r=0.32 p>0.05), length of stay (LOS) (r=0.02 p>0.05) and occupancy rate (r=0.07, p>0.05). 
However, there seems to exist a positive association with the utilisation of certain health 
technologies, in particular with the use of Computerised Axial Tomography  (r=0.64, r<0.01), and 
Digital Angiographies (r=0.39, p<0.1). Interestingly, it appears a positive association with quality of 
care: a negative significant correlation coefficient is identified (r=-0.53, p<0.05) when expenditure 
per capita is correlated with surgical infections. However, when several indicators were tested to 
examine whether there was any correlation between health (mortality, life expectancy, neonatal and 
prenatal mortality) and health expenditure, none of them displayed a significant correlation 
coefficient.  
 
A positive correlation between relative supply of beds and physician concentration is found 
(r=0.6, p<0.1). As expected, we find a positive association between length of stay  (LOS) and the 
bed occupancy rate (r=0.78, p<0.05). Interestingly, the higher the relative supply of beds, the higher 
the LOS (r=0.71, p<0.05) and the higher is the occupancy rate (r=0.67, p<0.05). In addition, we find 
a negative association between rotation and LOS (r=0.92, p<0.05) and occupancy rate (r=0.56, 
p<0.05). Finally, we examined the correlation coefficients between several health care indicators 
and resources and we found the following. First, female life expectancy was both associated with 
supply of beds (r=0.60. p<0.01) and physicians (r=0.68, p>0.01). The number of beds was negatively 
correlated with infant mortality (r=-0.61, p>0.01), neonatal mortality (r= -0.68, p>0.01) and perinatal 
mortality (r=-0.44, p>0.05). 
 
Although acknowledging the limitations of a cross-correlation analysis, there is no easily 
identifiable pattern on morbid-mortality factors capable to be located on a geographical basis and 
related to regional differences in health care inputs. However, as expected there is an association 
between technology and input availability with expenditure. Results suggest, by comparing trends in   30
expenditure, utilisation and outcomes a t the regional level, before and after the decentralization 
process, that differences in health care inputs are not systematically reflected into differences in 
outcomes. These are mostly related to within regions health related policies and not to the existing 
(minor) financial variation of resources amongst regions.  
 
5.  Citizens’ perceptions and satisfaction  
 
There is not much information about non-clinical dimensions of quality in Spain. The exception to this 
rule refers to  satisfaction surveys which  are contentious to interpret to the extent that might not 
evolve with real NHS developments. Roughly speaking, Spain occupies a middle-low position 
compared to other EU member states [ 55-56]. Interestingly, the Spanish health care barometer 
surveys provide evidence on satisfaction layers. Satisfaction with non-clinical quality dimensions of 
the system was higher for the Basque Country and Navarre as well as Valencia. INSALUD as a 
whole and Andalusia are generally on the Spain’s average whereas Catalonia and Canary Islands 
stand slightly below. Overall, people appear to be significantly satisfied with proximity of health care 
centres. Nevertheless, between 1986 and 1990 NHS satisfaction dropped continuously especially in 
satisfaction with the hospital sector. However, a recent survey for 2002 shows that about 50% is 
satisfied both with hospital and ambulatory care are perceived to have improved in the last ten years 
and the NHS obtains roughly a score of 6 out of a maximum of 10. Persistent problems are waiting 
lists especially in outpatient specialist visits as well as in impatient non-urgent care. Interestingly, 
citizens seem to be satisfied with the proximity of primary care centres and the treatment they 
receive from practitioners: 80% of those surveyed could remember the name of the practitioner. 
More than 50% of citizens perceive differences between urban and rural areas (Table 6). With 
regards to decentralisation 38% perceive that this has improved health care quality while 33% thinks 
that nothing will be changed 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Choice as a non-clinical outcome has traditionally conferred a low priority by public 
authorities. However, some AC have introduced the free choice of GP (Andalusia, and Catalonia 
within PC teams), a maximum waiting time before allowing patients freely to access to private 
practice publicly financed in Castilla-La Mancha, and several provisions on this respect have been   31
approved both at the regional and central levels during the 1990s such as the possibility of a second 
specialist advice in Canary islands and later exported to other regions, and the set up in the early 
nineties of the freedom of choice of GP within urban areas  for the 10 INSALUD AC.  
 
Other two issues that deserve some analysis are responsiveness and accountability concerns 
on citizens and patient acceptance of the NHS. Health care is the main priority for Spaniards jointly 
with housing and education. The analysis at the regional level of the representative surveys 
(Barometro Sanitario)  highlights that health care is the main priority in 12 out of 17 AC.  The vast 
majority of the population believes that the system needs minor changes, being the Basque Country 
and Navarre the AC where most of the population agreed on that the system was working well or 
needed minor changes. Balearic Islands and Canary Islands, receiving  a large amount of tourists a 
year, being those AC in which a larger share of population perceives that significant changes  are 
needed. 
 
Decentralisation and the set up of a democracy in  Spain can qualify as the two main issues 
that have influenced the most the political accountability. The Centre for Sociological Research 
(CIS) provides data on responsiveness suggesting that during the nineties 66% disagreed on paying 
more taxes and believed that it was possible to maintain the services by reducing taxes for public 
services but about the same percentage agreed from 1987-1998 that the government was 
responsible for welfare. Finally, a reducing share of 11% agrees on taxing for redistribute purposes. 
6. Conclusions  
 
This paper draws on examining the developments of the Spanish NHS during the last two 
decades whereby devolution and NHS consolidation have simultaneously taken place. Although 
‘ideal data’ is not always available, this study find comprehensive evidence pointing out that Spain 
has sought to decentralise the health system without weakening inter-regional social cohesion. We 
have focussed our study in examining regional diversity, efficiency and inequality in the Spanish 
NHS. Results suggest that regardless of significant heterogeneity, once we take into account region-
specific needs; there is evidence on innovations for efficiency improvements whilst inequalities in 
inputs and outcomes do not seem to have increased over time at the state level. Therefore, regional 
diversity in the Spanish universal NHS does not seem to be promoted at the expense of geographical   32
inequalities. Moreover, decentralisation of health care to regions has helped to break a more central 
monolithic bureaucratic pattern and spill financial pressures over more politically and fiscally more 
accountable regions. In doing so, devolution has proven to drive policy innovation.  
 
In the light of these results, we argue that in order to promote quality improvements a key 
issue may be to develop decentralisation further up to the clinical level. The Spanish Health System 
offers an excellent field for continuing experimenting reforms to improve health care delivery. At the 
current stage, challenges for health policy in Spain refer to four key points: improving information 
systems for a better coordination such as it is required for the integration of health care and this with 
social care at a geographical level; redesigning the system of incentives to promote providers 
networks; improving public participation through the involvement of local authorities at large in health 
care provision and setting up performance management objectives more closely related to the main 
population health targets [59].   
 
References 
[1]  Rico, A and Sabes, R. Health Care Systems in Transition: Spain. European Observatory on 
Health Care Systems,  2000 
[2]  Benach, J and Urbanos, R.M. Evaluación del objetivo de equidad en salud. In Informe 
SESPAS, 1999. 
[3]  Powell, M and Boyne, G. The Spatial strategy for Equality and the Spatial Division of Welfare. 
Social Policy and Administration, 35: 181-194, 200. 
[4]  Rico, A and Costa-Font, J. Power rather than path? The dynamics of health care federalism 
and the building of the Spanish NHS.  Journal of Health Policy, Politics and Law 2004 
(forthcoming). 
[5]  Rico, A and López, 2003 Lopez-Casasnovas, G. Devolution of health care in Spain to the 
regions becomes a reality. Eurohealth 8 (3): 36-38, 2002. 
[6]  Giannoni, M and Hitiris,T. The regional impact of health care expenditure: the case of Italy. 
Applied Economics 34 (14): 1829 - 1836, 2002. 
[7]  Lopez-Casasnovas G, Rico A.  Decentralization: part of the health system problem or the 
solution? Gac Sanit. 2003 Jul-Aug;17(4):319-26 
[8]  Lopez-Casasnovas, G. Devolution of health care in Spain to the regions becomes a reality. 
Eurohealth (2002) 8 (3): 36-38. 
[9]  Costa, J and Garcia, J. 'Demand for Private Health Insurance: How Important is the Quality 
Gap?' Health Economics 12: 587-599 (2003). 
[10]  Jofre-Bonet, M (2000). Public health care and private insurance demand: the waiting time as a 
link. Health Care Management Science, 3: 51-71 
[11]  López Casasnovas, G .1998. Financiación autonómica y gasto sanitario público en España. 
Papeles de Economía Española., 76: 2-14.    33
[12]  Barea J et al. Análisis económico de los gastos públicos en sanidad y previsión de los 
recursos necesarios a medio plazo. Instituto de Estudios Fiscales. Mº de Economía y 
Hacienda. Madrid. 1993.   
[13]  Blanco A. and de Bustos A. El gasto sanitario público en España: Diez años de Sistema 
Nacional de Salud. April 1996. Working Paper Dirección General de Planificación. 
Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda. Madrid 
[14]  López- Casasnovas, G and Casado, D. La financiación de la sanidad pública española: 
aspectos macroeconómicos e incidencia en la descentralización fiscal. Presupuesto y Gasto 
Público 20/1996 123-152 
[15]  Pellisé, L., Truyol, I., Blanco, A. and Sánchez-Prieto, F. Financiación sanitaria y proceso 
transferencial, G.López-Casasnovas (ed.) In  La evaluación de las políticas de servicios 
sanitarios el Estado de las Autonomías. Análisis comparativo de las Comunidades 
Autónomas del Andalucía, Cataluña y el País Vasco. Bilbao: Fundación BBV e Institut 
d’Estudis Autonomics. 2001.  
[16]  Murillo, C. and González, B. El sector sanitario en España. Situación actual y perspectivas de 
futuro. Hacienda Pública Española 1993; 41-58. 
[17]  Martínez, E. Las deducciones en el IRPF por gasto sanitario privado: situación actual y 
posibilidades de reforma. Papeles de Economía Española 1998, 76: 273-283.  
[18]  González, B. and P. Barber. Changes in the efficiency of Spanish public hospitals after the 
introduction of program-contracts, Investigaciones Económicas 1996, XX,3:377-402. 
[19]  Casado D. and López Casasnovas G., Vejez, dependencia y cuidados de larga duración. 
Colección de Estudios Sociales 2001. Fundació La Caixa. 
[20]  Peiró S ¿Son siempre odiosas las comparaciones? Gestión Clínica y Sanitaria 2002, 4(2), 
Editorial: 35-37. 
[21]  Puig-Junoy, J. Los Mecanismos de Copago en Servicios Sanitarios: Cuando, Cómo y Porqué. 
Hacienda Pública Española 2001.  
[22]  Cabasés J M , Martín J J, and López del Amo M P. La eficiencia de las organizaciones 
sanitarias. Papeles de Economía Española 2003 (95): 195-212 
[23]  Wagstaff A. Estimating efficiency in the hospital sector: a comparison of three statistical cost 
frontier models. Applied Economics, 21: 659-672. 1989 
[24]  Puig-Junoy, J.  Ineficiencia técnica y asignativa en la producción hospitalaria: Una 
aplicación AED-AR. Documento de Trabajo de la Fundación BBV 1999. Madrid.  
[25]  Prior, D . and Solà M. Technical efficiency and economies of diversification in health care. 
Health Care Management Science 2000 (3): 299-307. 
[26]  Carretero, L., C. Pérez, M.P. López del Amo, and J. Martín. Utilización del  benchmarking 
en la evaluación de la eficiencia del Hospital Costa del Sol. Comunicación presentada en 
la sesión sobre eficiencia. XVII Jornadas de Economía de la Salud, Murcia. 1997. 
[27]  Navarro, J.L.  Internacionalización de las técnicas de gestión sanitaria. PhD Thesis, 
Universidad de Granada. 1997. 
[28]  Solà, M. Avaluació de la gestió hospitalària: determinació de les economies de diversificació i 
valoració dinàmica de la qualitat i la productivitat. Tesis doctoral, Departament d'Economia de 
l'Empresa. Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. 1998. 
[29]  Navarro, J.L. Salarios y eficiencia productiva en hospitales. XXI Jornadas de Economía de la 
Salud, Oviedo June 6-8. 2001.   34
[30]  González, B., P. Barber, and J. Pinilla.  Estimación de la eficiencia de los hospitales 
generales de agudos mediante modelos de frontera estocástica, en La evaluación de las 
políticas de servicios sanitarios en el estado de las autonomías. Análisis comparativo de las 
CC.AA del País Vasco, Andalucía y Catalunya. Fundación BBV y Institut d'Estudis 
Autonòmics. Generalitat de Catalunya.1999. 
[31]  García Prieto, C. Ineficiencia técnica y asignativa en los hospitales del Insalud, Estudios 
sobre Economía Española FEDEA. EEE 63. Madrid.1999. 
[32]  López-Casasnovas G. and M. Sáez. The Impact of Teaching Status on Average Costs in 
Spanish Hospitals. Health Economics 1999, 8: 641-651. 
[33]  Rodríguez-Álvarez A. La medida de la eficiencia asignativa en una burocracia: El sector 
hospitalario público español. Tesis doctoral, Universidad de Oviedo 2000, Departamento de 
Economía. 
[34]  García C.  Ineficiencia técnica y asignativa en los hospitales de Castilla y León. 
Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico. Universidad de Valladolid. 2001. 
[35]  García C.  Determinación de la ineficiencia técnica en presencia de ineficiencia 
asignativa. Una aplicación a los hospitales públicos españoles. XXI Jornadas de Economías 
de la Salud.   
[36]  Ventura, J., and González E. Análisis de la eficiencia técnica hospitalaria del Insalud G.D. en 
Castilla y León, Revista de Investigación Económica y Social de Castilla y León, 1:39-50. 
1999. 
[37]  Dalmau, E., and Puig-Junoy J. Market structure and hospital efficiency: evaluating potential 
effects of deregulation in a National Health Service,  Review of Industrial Organization 
13:447-466. 1998. 
[38]  Badenes, N. and Urbanos R. Análisis de la eficiencia técnica como medida de gestión 
sanitaria: una aplicación a la atención primaria de salud, en Economía de la Salud, 
Textos al V Congreso Nacional de Economía, Las Palmas: 243-255. 1995. 
[39]  Urbina, O. Modelización y medida de la eficiencia en atención primaria. Tesis doctoral. 
Universidad de Zaragoza.2000. 
[40]  Goñi, S. El Análisis Envolvente de Datos como sistema de evaluación de la eficiencia 
técnica de las organizaciones del Sector Público: Aplicación en los Equipos de Atención 
Primaria, Revista Española de Financiación y Contabilidad 1998, XXVII, 97: 979-1004. 
[41]  Puig-Junoy, J. and Ortún V. Cost Efficiency in Primary Care Contracting. A  Stochastic 
Frontier Cost Function Approach. UPF Working Paper 2000, Barcelona. 
[42]  Gonzalez, B et al (2001). Organización y Gestión. In Lopez-Casanovas, G and Rico, A (eds). 
Evaluación de las políticas de Servicios Sanitarios en el estado de las Autonomías. Fundación 
BBV, pp 15-233 (Tomo II). 
[43]  Moya-Ruiz C, Peiró S, Meneu R. (2002) Effectiveness of feedback to physicians in reducing 
inappropriate use of hospitalization. Int J Qual Health Care; 14: 305-312 and  Meneu R. 
Variabilidad de las decisiones médicas y su repercusión sobre las poblaciones. 
Colección Economía de la Salud y Gestión Sanitaria. Dir. Vicente Ortún. Ed. Masson. S.A. 
Barcelona. 2002. 
[44]  Sarriá A and Sendra  JM. Diferencias regionales en la utilización hospitalaria.  Gaceta 
Sanitaria 1993; 7:63-69 
[45]  Compañ L, Peiró S, and Meneu R. Variaciones geográficas en hospitalizaciones quirúrgicas en 
ancianos: una aproximación a partir de la Encuesta de Morbilidad Hospitalaria. Revista de 
Gerontología 1995; 5:166-170.    35
[46]  Sarria A and García P. Diferencias en la utilización de hospitales en las Comunidades 
Autónomas de Madrid y Cataluña Gaceta Sanitaria 1996;10:12-17. 
[47]  Meneu R. Repercusiones económicas de la variabilidad en la p ráctica médica. En: Necesidad 
Sanitaria, Demanda y Utilización. XIX Jornadas de Economía de la Salud. Zaragoza: 
Asociación de Economía de la Salud 1999,383-389. 
[48]  Ortún V, Gispert R. Exploración de la mortalidad prematura como guía de política sanitaria e 
indicador de calidad asistencial. Med Clin (Barc) 1988;90:399-403 
[49]   Rodríguez, M Calonge, S and Reñé, J. Equity in the finance and delivery of health care in 
Spain. Van Doorsaler, E ;Wagstaff, A and Rutten, F (eds).  Equity in the finance and 
delivery of health care. An international perspective. Oxford University Press, pp 201-218.  
University Press, New York.   pp 31-64. 1993. 
[50]   Urbanos R. La prestación de los servicios sanitarios públicos en España: cálculo y análisis de 
la equidad horizontal interpersonal para el período 1987-1995. Hacienda Pública Española 
2000, 153-2: 139-160. 
[51]   Urbanos, R. Measurement of inequality in the delivery of public health care: evidence from 
Spain (1997). Working Paper FEDEA 2001, 2001-15. 
[52]  Urbanos, RM (2000). Desigualdades sociales en salud y efectividad potencial de las políticas 
públicas: un estudio aplicado con datos españoles. Hacienda Pública Española, 154: 217-
238. 
[53]   Calonge S and Manresa A.  Incidencia Fiscal y del Gasto Público Social sobre la 
Distribución de la Renta en España y sus CC.AA. Fundación BBV. Bilbao.2001. 
[54]  Blendon R.J., Minah K, and Benson,JM The Public versus the World Health Organization on 
health system performance, Health Affairs, vol.20, N°3, May-June 2001. 
[55]   Mossialos, E. Citizens’ view on health systems in the 15 Member states of the European 
Union, Health Economics 1999, Vol. 6, 109-116. 
[56]  Costa J. Wittemberg R. and Patxot J. The effects of demographic assumptions of long-term 
care expenditure. In Comas et al.  European Study of Long-Term Care Expenditure, 
European Commission.2002. Brussels. 
[57]  Vertrees JC., Manton KG. A multivariate approach for classifying hospitals Medi. Care 24: 
283- 300, 1986. 
[58]  Fundacion Avedis Donabedian. 2003. Mimeo for The Catalan Health Service 
[59]  G.López-Casasnovas (ed.) In  La evaluación de las políticas de servicios sanitarios el 
Estado de las Autonomías. Análisis comparativo de las Comunidades Autónomas del 
Andalucía, Cataluña y el País Vasco. Bilbao: Fundación BBV e Institut d’Estudis 
Autonomics. 2001 
   36
Figure 1. An overview of the Spanish NHS and the Catalan Health Service for 
Comparative purposes 
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Table 1. Health Expenditure in Spain 1995–2001 
  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001 
Public Expenditure 
Million €  24,125  25,686  26,877  28,616  30,681  32,671  35,131 
% Total  72.3  72.4  72.5  72.3  72.2  71.7  71.5 
% GDP  5.5  5.5  5.4  5.4  5.4  5.4  5.4 
Private Expenditure 
Million €  9,262  9,774  10,176  10,978  11,831  12,866  13,987 
% Total  27.7  27.6  27.5  27.7  27.8  28.3  28.5 
% GDP  2.1  2.1  2.1  2.1  2.1  2.1  2.1 
Total Expenditure 
Million €  33,387  35,460  37,053  39,594  42,512  45,537  49,118 
% Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
% GDP  7.6  7.6  7.5  7.5  7.5  7.5  7.5 
Source: Ministerio de Sanidad y Consumo, 2003. 
 
Table 2: Average annual rate of growth of real health expenditure and of GPD (*) 
1978-2001 Spain versus the European Union. 
  1978-83  1983-88  1988-93  1993-98  1999-2001 
Spain  2.4(1.2)  4.8(3.4)  5.7(2.0)  2.4(3.1)  3.5(3.4) 
European Union  3.1(1.8)  3.7(3.1)  4.0(2.1)  2.7(3.3)  5.3(2.5) 
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Table 3. Health  indicators by AC (Life Expectancy, Mortality, Neonatal Mortality, 
Perinatal Mortality, Premature avoidable mortality by health care and health policy) 




























Andalusia  73.5  80.7  8.3  5.8  3.5  2.3  6.9  18.32  11.04 
Aragón  75.6  82.3  10.8  3.7  2.5  1.1  4.8  19.39  6.07 
Asturias  73.1  81.3  11.8  4.6  2.8  1.7  7.3  20.90  8.45 
Balears  73.2  81.1  9.3  4.6  2.5  2  8.2  22,49  8.03 
Canary I.  73.8  81.3  7.1  5  2.9  2.1  7  22..98  10.42 
Cantabria  74.4  82.2  10.1  3.1  0.8  2.3  1.8  19.70  6.31 
Castilla-LM  76.1  81.7  9.7  5.2  3.1  2.2  6  15.08  6.03 
Castilla  Leon  76.3  83.2  10.4  3.6  2.6  1  4.4  22.34  5.93 
Catalonia  74.7  82.3  9.1  3.8  2.4  1.4  5.2  14.50  6.44 
Valencia  74.1  81  9.1  4.5  3.2  1.3  5.4  18.28  8.06 
Extremadura  74.6  81.5  9.7  4.3  2.6  1.7  5.8  24.01  7.15 
Galicia  73.9  81.8  10.6  5.2  3.1  2  5.3  17.21  6.88 
Madrid  75.1  83  7.4  4.2  2.3  1.9  4.3  15.05  4.17 
Murcia  74.5  80.9  8.2  5.9  3.4  2.4  6.9  25.50  7.30 
Navarre  75.7  83  9.2  5.5  3  2.4  6.9  20.09  6.55 
Basque C.  74  82.2  8.8  6.1  4.1  2  6.5  19.76  6.47 
La Rioja  72.2  82  9.6  5.9  3.6  2.3  7.3  19.18  5.96 
Total   74.4  81.6  9.4  4.9  3  1.9  5.9  19.28  7.13 
INSALUD  74.5  81.9  9.7  4.5  2.6  1.9  5.7  20.22  6.54 
CVTotal  0.01  0.01  0.13  0.19  0.24  0.24  0.26  0.17  0.24 
Source: MSC 2002, INE and own calculation following De Manuel et al (2001) methodology in G.Lopez- 
Casasnovas, 2001[58].
1Life Expectancy in years,2000. 
2Mortrality Rate per 1000 in 2000. 
3Premutaure 
Rate per 10,000 in 1998 (health care related) 4Premutaure Rate per 10,000 in 1998 (health policy related) 
 
Table 4. Life expectancy by age gender and AC 
  1980  1990   1995  1999*  
Females at birth – Years  78.6  80.4  81.5  82.4 
Females at age 65 – Years  17.9  19.1  19.8  20.5 
Males at birth – Years  72.5  73.3  74.3  74.9 
Males at age 65 – Years  14.8  15.4  16.0  16.4 
Total at birth- Years  75.6  76.9  77.9  78.7 
Andalusia  74.5  76  76.9  77.46 
Canary Islands  74.2  76  77.3  77.6 
Catalonia   76.9  77.3  78.2  79.1 
Valencia  74.9  76.3  77.2  78 
Galicia  75.2  76.6  77.8  78.8 
Navarre  75.3  78.1  79  79.9 
Basque C.  75  77.2  78  79 
INSALUD-10  75.5  77.24  78.15  78.9   40
Source : MSC, 2002 *Data on AC life expectancy refers to the latest from 1998.  
 
 
Table 5.  General opinion on the NHS 1993-2003 (% of responses) 
  1993  1994  1995  1997  1998  1999  2000  2002 
Works well  19.8  17.1  20.1  20.2  19.9  21.8  21.6  18.6 
Works well but needs changes  32.8  36.6  40.7  41.3  43.1  44.7  46  48.2 
Needs fundamental changes  29.5  31  28.5  29.2  28.4  25.4  25.8  27.6 
Needs re-making  17.9  13.8  9.8  7.8  7.3  6.7  6.5  5.6 
Source: Ministerio de Sanidad y Consumo, 2003 
 
Appendix 
Table A1.  Relative and per capita health expenditure in Spain 1980-2001 
  Total exp. 
on health % 
GDP 
Total exp. 




on health % 
GDP 
Public exp. 




on health % 
GDP 
Private exp 
on health / 
capita, US$ 
PPP 
1980  5.4  328  4.3  262  1.1  66 
1981  5.6  367  4.4  289  1.2  78 
1982  5.7  402  4.5  319  1.2  83 
1983  5.8  426  4.9  362  0.9  64 
1984  5.6  436  4.6  357  1  79 
1985  5.5  455  4.4  369  1  86 
1986  5.4  472  4.3  377  1.1  95 
1987  5.5  526  4.4  419  1.1  107 
1988  6.1  637  4.8  505  1.3  133 
1989  6.3  712  4.9  557  1.4  155 
1990  6.7  813  5.3  640  1.4  173 
1991  6.9  917  5.3  711  1.5  206 
1992  7.2  990  5.6  766  1.6  224 
1993  7.5  1053  5.8  806  1.8  246 
1994  7.4  1055  5.6  797  1.8  258 
1995  7.6  1163  5.5  839  2.1  323 
1996  7.6  1217  5.5  880  2.1  336 
1997  7.5  1269  5.4  920  2.1  349 
1998  7.5  1353  5.4  976  2.1  376 
1999  7.5  1426  5.4  1028  2.1  398 
2000  7.5  1497  5.3  1073  2.1  424 
2001  7.5  1600  5.4  1143  2.1  457 
Source: OECD HEALTH DATA 2003 3rd ed. 
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Table A2.  Health expenditure layers 1980-2001 
  Public Expenditure in-patient 
.care 
Public Expenditure out-patient 
care 
Public Pharma. & other medic 
durables expenditure 
  /capita, US$ 
PPP 
% GDP  /capita, US$ 
PPP 
% GDP  /capita, US$ 
PPP 
% GDP 
1980  144  2.4  55  0.9  44  0.7 
1981  159  2.4  61  0.9  48  0.7 
1982  175  2.5  65  0.9  54  0.8 
1983  209  2.8  72  1  56  0.8 
1984  207  2.7  70  0.9  54  0.7 
1985  207  2.5  75  0.9  58  0.7 
1986  208  2.4  77  0.9  56  0.6 
1987  233  2.4  80  0.8  63  0.7 
1988  261  2.5  104  1  88  0.8 
1989  297  2.6  103  0.9  93  0.8 
1990  347  2.8  118  1  104  0.9 
1991  400  3  119  0.9  120  0.9 
1992  436  3.2  128  0.9  132  1 
1993  466  3.3  130  0.9  137  1 
1994  460  3.2  131  0.9  142  1 
1995  471  3.1  138  0.9  159  1 
1996  492  3.1  142  0.9  173  1.1 
1997  506  3  148  0.9  192  1.1 
1998  532  2.9  155  0.9  205  1.1 
1999  553  2.9  164  0.9  222  1.2 
2000  572  2.9  169  0.8  234  1.2 
2001  604  2.8  180  0.8  251  1.2 
Source: OECD HEALTH DATA 2003 3rd edition. 
 
Table A3. Decomposition of the determinants of total Health Expenditure growth 1993-
2001 
 
Years  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000
p  2001
p 
Total  6.83%  3.26%  5.67%  6.47%  4.63%  6.14%  7.31%  6.34%  7.48% 
Ageing  0.81%  0.79%  0.77%  0.78%  0.83%  0.93%  1.09%  1.33%  1.41% 
Utilisation  5.09%  -0.44%  0.85%  1.39%  2.36%  2.25%  3.42%  1.65%  2.61% 
Medical input prices -3.91%  -1.38%  -0.32%  0.97%  -0.61%  1.42%  -0.26%  -0.69%  0.56% 
General inflation  4.93%  4.34%  4.32%  3.21%  2.01%  1.41%  2.2%  3.96%  2.71% 









Table A4. Panel data results (GLS model): Determinants of public health care 
expenditure at the regional level (1992-1999) 
 
  coef.  Std. Err.  coef.  Std. Err. 
Population  -0.288**  0.061  -1.037**  0.312 
GDP  0.331**  0.058  1.071**  0.070 
Ageing  2X10-5  9X10-5  1.5X10
-4**  6X10
-4 
Occupancy  -0.007  0.004  0.001  0.002 
LOS  0.321**  0.096  -0.044  0.153 
Beds  -0.008  0.025  0.049*  0.029 
Personnel  0.173**  0.063  -0.106  0.094 
Intercept  10.21**  0.435  10.23**  4.01 
Adj_R
2  0.51    0.91   
F  12.42    146.55   
Fixed Effects  No    Yes   
Note: * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%. 